Introduction
The right to equal recognition before the law is a key concept in international human rights law. It encompasses both the ability to be the holder of rights (including legal standing) and the ability to be an actor in law (legal agency). The Voices of Individuals: Collectively Exploring Self-determination (VOICES) project aims to reform the law in relation to legal capacity for persons with disabilities following the enactment of Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This article aims to summarise the current state of the art surrounding Article 12 of the CRPD and to provide readers of the special issue with a general understanding of the main concepts so they can fully engage with the other articles and with the content of the VOICES project as a whole.
Firstly, this article will summarise the history of the right to equal recognition before the law to place recent developments in context, before clarifying some key terms that appear across the literature in this area. We then examine Article 12 and General Comment No. 1 from the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2014) and their impact on the right to equal recognition before the law for persons with disabilities. Finally, we examine the state of the art following these developments * We wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the following members of the Advisory Committee and Steering Group for the VOICES project for their valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this article -Tina Minkowitz for her contributions on the history and drafting of the CRPD and for recommending further readings, Elizabeth Kamundia and Mirraim Nthenge for sourcing materials from the global south and key clarifications on the concepts of support, Michelle Browning for recommending readings from the Australian perspective and alternative views on substituted decision making, Alexander Ruck Keene for his guidance on issues relating to the Mental Capacity Act and factual incapacity, Theresia Degener for recommending further reading on the history and drafting and Piers Gooding for recommending further reading and highlighting important clarifications. However, any errors or inaccuracies are the sole responsibility of the authors. exploring some of the main criticisms of Article 12 and the General Comment and the responses by leading scholars in the field of legal capacity, equality and disability.
Equal Recognition Before the Law
The right to equal recognition before the law was first codified in international law by Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1949. The Declaration was not a legally binding document; however, over the years its principles have come to be regarded as customary norms in international law (Haleem 1988 ). Since then the right has been featured in three international human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations.
Article 16 of the the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted in 1966 contains the earliest expression of the right to equal recognition before the law in a legally binding treaty. The wording of the provision echoes that of the UDHR and an analysis of the treaty negotiations suggests a focus on legal standing over legal agency . (Quinn, 2009 ) and this is evident in Article 1 which states that it aims to 'promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by persons with disabilities'. The CRPD has been identified as a catalyst for change, marking the paradigm shift from viewing persons with disabilities as objects of charity and medical treatment to identifying them as subjects with legal rights (Arbour 2006) . The CRPD only reformulates existing rights in the context of persons with disabilities and does not create any new rights (Kayess and French 2008) as required by the mandate from the General Assembly under which the text was developed. However, there has been an on-going debate in the literature following the Convention as to whether this ideal was realised or whether the Convention did in fact create new rights for persons with disabilities (Mégret, 2008) . Article 12 builds on existing international provisions to apply the right to equal recognition before the law to persons with disabilities. It is comprised of five paragraphs, and is modelled on the previous treaties to set out a right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others for persons with disabilities. The right to legal capacity it articulates encompasses both legal standing and legal agency. As with all international human rights treaties, the CRPD is a statement of general principles that does not define key terms or delve into the practicalities of how to achieve the rights it sets out. The 'paradigm shift' and increased understanding of Article 12 can be tracked in the literature published following the negotiation of the CRPD. Much of which published immediately after the CRPD was adopted focused on interpreting the text and analysing its practical implications, with many authors looking to the drafting process for guidance (Minkowitz 2010; Dhanda 2006 Dhanda -2007 Quinn 2009; Kayess & French 2008; Mc Sherry 2012; Kanter 2014 (Dawson 2015; Gooding 2015; Browning et al 2014) .
Distinguishing Legal Capacity and Mental Capacity
It is important to distinguish the concept of 'legal capacity' from 'mental capacity'.
Legal capacity is a concept contained within the broad heading of equal recognition before the law. It has been defined as the right to be recognised as a person before the people make decisions and different levels of cognitive ability should not be used as a means to assess and deny legal capacity (Minkowitz 2010) . The paradigm shift, set out above, can only truly be put in context however, by reflecting briefly on the evolution of legal norms concerning legal capacity generally.
The Denial of Legal Capacity
Historically, legal capacity was granted or denied based on various characteristics as either society or the law dictated. This is illustrated by two well-known examples of deprivations of legal capacity. Blackstone (1979) noted that women in marriage were seen as suffering a 'civil death' as they were denied their legal capacity when their legal identity was incorporated into their husband's. In the U.S., slaves were also denied their legal capacity or personhood because the law saw them as only three fifths of a person.
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Disability is one of the only remaining characteristics under which society and the law justifies denying an individual her legal capacity on an equal basis with others. This disproportionately affects people with intellectual or psycho-social disabilities due to the view that legal capacity is often assessed based on a level of cognitive ability and understanding consequences known as mental capacity, as outlined above.
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Three methods of assessment are primarily used to determine if someone should be denied her legal capacity -status, outcome or the functional test (Dhanda 2006 (Dhanda -2007 .
These methods have been extensively discussed elsewhere therefore, only a brief outline is set out below. In a status approach, incapacity is presumed from a medical questioned although her capacity to consent to treatment initially was not at issue Congress, 1789 Congress, -1999 ; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives. 8 For a discussion on how legal capacity affects people with a psychosocial disability in particular, see Minkowitz (2014) . (Dhanda 2006 (Dhanda -2007 . This test also clearly holds persons with disabilities to a higher standard in decision making than the rest of the population.
The functional approach, used in many countries 9 typically assesses whether the person with an 'impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain' 10 understands the decision and all the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the decision. Legislation based on the functional approach typically requires that the person must be able to use, weigh and retain the information necessary to make the decision, to understand the consequences of their decision, and to communicate her decision to others. 11 Again however, a person's decisions would generally not be subject to such scrutiny but for her status or diagnosis and therefore, many commentators believe that all three tests are discriminatory Dhanda 2006 Dhanda -2007 (Minkowitz 2006 (Minkowitz -2007 and through the legal system where a person is found to lack the necessary legal capacity to take a case in court 13 , is seen as 'incompetent' to testify, or found not guilty by reason of insanity (Minkowitz 2014) .
12 See for example Mental Disability Advocacy Center's (2007a) & (2007b) research. 13 In some jurisdictions, a person who is not subject to formal guardianship can still be deprived of their capacity to instruct a lawyer or take a case to court on the basis that they are of 'unsound mind' and therefore must act via their litigation or next friend. For a detailed discussion on legal capacity and participation in litigation see Series (2015) . another to make a decision and communicate it to others' (Series 2015) . This kind of support can be provided in many contexts, including those in which decisions do not affect legal consequences, or create, alter or extinguish legal relationships (Arstein- 17 For further reading and examples of support, see Gordon (2000) , Gold (1994) and Herr (2003) .
Substituted and Supported Decision Making

Kerslake & Flynn 2017). Support to exercise legal capacity, however, will always result in a decision that has legal consequences (Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn 2017).
Another significant definition in the General Comment was substituted decision making. This term was used by the Committee in its concluding observations to States and was something governments were urged to replace but it was never defined. The
General Comment states that a substituted decision making regime violates human rights norms when:
1. a person has her legal capacity removed, even for a single decision, 
States Obligations
After desrcribing the normative content of Article 12 the General Comment considers
States Obligations, giving practical guidance on how to achieve them. Three core obligations have been identified -1. to abolish substituted decision making regimes, 2.
to make mechanisms available to support persons with disabilities to exercise their legal capacity and 3. to create safeguards around exercising legal capacity which are based on respect for the rights, will and preferences of the individual.
A vital clarification for states beginning the law reform process has been that they are only obliged to abolish substituted decision making regimes that meet the definition 
In the wake of the General Comment: Conflicting Interpretations
Following the publication of the General Comment, the focus of the literature surrounding Article 12 progressed from interpreting the text to either plotting its practical implementation or criticising the Committee's interpretations and providing alternatives. One of the main criticisms originally made in many of the submissions on the Draft General Comment, was that never allowing mental capacity to lead to a denial of legal capacity is both impractical and unrealistic. 22 Ward (2015) relies on the concept of "factual incapacity" to argue that, in some circumstances, no matter how much support is provided to a person, it will remain impossible to determine what decision the person wishes to make. This argument appears to ignore the Committee's delineation of a 'best interpretation' framework to guide decisionmaking where after all efforts to support a person, their will and preferences remain unknown.
A well known psychiatrist, John Dawson (2015) , argues that mental capacity is often used to define the line between two conflicting state obligations -respecting individual autonomy and protecting vulnerable individuals. He believes that determinations of mental capacity are necessary so that the State knows when it can intervene. As discussed in Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (2017), it should be possible for the state to develop a disability-neutral basis for intervention to protect the human rights of people at risk of abuse, exploitation, violence or neglect, without using discriminatory tests of mental capacity. Dawson (2015) further argues that many aspects of the legal system require assessments of the inner workings of the mind and that most sophisticated legal systems would be impoverished without them. Such provisions include the concept of intention or 'mens rea' in criminal law and defences such as diminished responsibility.
Professor Michael Perlin (2015) 
Conflicting Views on Hard Cases
Article 12 sets out to create a system in which everyone is guaranteed their right to legal capacity recognising that some people desire support to exercise legal capacity and to express their will and preferences (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2014). However, not everyone agrees with some commentators arging that the position set out in the General Comment threatens other rights contained in the CRPD. These critiques often focus on the need to act in emergency situations and when informed consent cannot be received from the individual. For example, Freeman et al (2015) argue that "several fundamental rights, such as the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, access to justice, the right to liberty, and even the right to life, might instead be violated and subject to unintended consequences" as a result of the right to legal capacity found in Article 12. This is ironic given that the denial of legal capacity often leads to an individual being deprived of her liberty and subject to involuntary treatment. They suggest that in such circumstances legal capacity cannot be absolute, and that some form of substituted decision making must be allowed. Others argue for some form of substituted decision making to be provided where an individual has profound or multiple disabilities as they believe that it is not realistic for these individuals to be supported to exercise their legal capacity (Browning et al 2014) . However, some of these commentators (Browning et al 2014) still accept some elements of the support paradigm and that some individuals can and should be supported to make decisions. They simply do not agree that support is a viable option for everyone or that substituted decision making, as defined in the General Comment, should be abolished.
Those in favour of Article 12 have also considered these possibilities and acknowledge that in some limited situations an individual may be appointed to discover or interpret a person's will and preferences (Quinn 2010) . If the person's will and preferences remain unknown after significant efforts to discover them have been made, and it is urgent that a decision must be made (for example, consent or refusal of life-saving surgery); then Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn (2016) The General Comment addresses and provides interpretive guidance on provisions relating to these so-called 'hard cases'. It states that when a person's will and preferences cannot be ascertained, for example, in the case of a coma patient, the 'best interpretation' of that person's will and preferences should be used to make a decision.
This however, does not address all situations. Other scenarios which represent hard cases include where a person's will and preferences are clear but dangerous and when an individual is communicating conflicting will and preferences. Although the General Comment does not address these situations explicitly, Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn (2016) have developed an approach to these cases that can be used based on the principles found in the General Comment.
In the first situation, where a person expresses will and preferences which would lead to serious harm to others or to self-harm, they argue that a support person is not obliged do something which would leave her open to civil or criminal liability. In such circumstances, it is also necessary to note that states will have different standards for when it is necessary to intervene, as discussed by Flynn and Arstein
Kerslake (2017) regimes will need to be strictly monitored to ensure that they do not indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities.
In the second situation, where a person's will and preferences are clear but conflicting, the example of a person with tooth decay who does not want to go to the dentist but clearly wants to be free from pain is often used (Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn 2016) . In this instance the 'will', is used to describe a person's long term vision of what could be a good life for her, in this example, to be free from pain. 'Preferences' on the other hand, describe the person's likes and dislikes or prioritisation of options, in this example, the wish not to go to the dentist. Here, the first step for a supporter would be to resolve the conflict by discussing the situation with the individual using all forms of communication available and including the individual's other trusted supporters.
Where this does not lead to a clear decision after every attempt has been made to reconcile the conficiting will and preferences a supporter must turn to an external decision maker for the 'best interpretation' of a person's will and preferences.
However, if a person takes a course of action which poses a risk of grave and imminent harm to her life, health or safety, also considered in Flynn and ArsteinKerslake (2017), a state actor may be permitted to intervene -as long as these interventions are made on an equal basis for persons with and without disabilities. As previously argued by , a reformulation of the doctrine of necessity might also permit some forms of intervention on an equal basis for people with and without disabilities in these cases. There are however, limits as described by This is, of course, a risk for people relying on supported decision making. However, as Gooding (2015) notes in his response to these criticisms, we should remember that everyone is subject to influence, manipulation and subtle coercion by those close to them. Series (2015b) notes modern feminist thought's recognition that all of our acts, decisions, values and beliefs are profoundly influenced by our relationships.
Therefore, as Gooding (2015) suggests, we should not subject persons with disabilities to a higher level of state intrusion solely on this basis. The General Comment also recognises that people relying on support from others to make decisions may be more susceptible to influence or manipulation. The safeguards within Article 12(4) require measures to prevent abuse, but also ensure they respect the rights, will and preferences of a person and are free from conflict of interest and undue influence. This area is not yet entirely clear, but it appears that persons with disabilities must be allowed the 'dignity of risk' (Gooding 2013) in this regard on an equal basis with others.
Progressive Realisation vs Immediate Effect
As one of the civil and political rights found within the CRPD, the right to equal recognition before the law is subject to immediate realisation 23 (McSherry & Wilson 2015 
